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Security Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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17 November 1952

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 283 (Revised)

SUBJECT: Draft Memorandum for the IAC

SUBJECT: Program of Estimates Through 1953

Reference: Memorandum for the IAC, dated 5 May 1952, subject:  
Program of Estimates for Remainder of 1952.

I. WORK IN PROCESS

1. The Office of National Estimates has the following estimates in process, which it proposes to complete:

a. NIE-45: Probable Attitudes and Policies of the Free World Toward the East-West Conflict. Work on this project was postponed pending the conclusion of NIE-64 (Part II). Work has been resumed and terms of reference will be forwarded to the IAC at an early date. Tentative target date for receipt of contributions: February 1, 1953.

b. NIE-56: Consequences of the Loss of Important Economic Resources of the Far East. The draft estimate will be forwarded to the IAC representatives within a few days. For similar papers on other areas, see paragraph 4 below (page 9).

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- c. NIE-59: Relative Strategic Importance of East-West Trade to the Soviet Orbit and the Rest of the World. The EIC report was received on 3 October 1952 and is under review.
- d. NIE-63: France's Prospective Ability to Play a Major Role in the Western Security System. Contributions were received on 27 August; the draft estimate will reach the IAC representatives at an early date.
- e. NIE-64 (Part II): Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through mid-1953. The draft estimate is now before the IAC representatives.
- f. NIE-65: Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957. The last contribution is due December 16, 1952. Completion of this paper will facilitate accurate estimates of Soviet bloc capabilities on a shorter term and will provide assistance in estimating Soviet strategy over longer periods (see paragraphs 2a and 3a).
- g. NIE-70: Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security. The draft estimate is now before the IAC representatives.

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- h. NIE-71: Probable Outlook for Italy: The last contribution was received on 29 September 1952. The draft estimate will reach the IAC representatives in December.
- i. NIE-73: Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security. The last contribution was received on 9 September. The draft estimate will reach the IAC representatives in December.
- j. NIE-74: Probable Developments in Burma through 1953. The last contribution was received on November 1953. The draft estimate will reach the IAC representatives late in November.
- k. NIE-76: Implications for the West of Developments in Egypt. Terms of reference are being drafted and will reach the IAC representatives at an early date.
- l. Project Longview: Soviet Intentions Through 1962. At the direction of the DCI, a draft estimate is being prepared by the Office of National Estimates and will be submitted to the IAC representatives. If full coordination cannot be achieved by November 30, the Board draft will be submitted directly to the IAC.

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II. PRIORITY NEW ESTIMATES

2. The Board believes that the following problems, not previously estimated, should be subjects of estimates in 1953 and that they should be given the highest priority:<sup>\*</sup>

a. Probable Soviet Strategy through 1961:<sup>\*\*</sup> This paper would not estimate precise Soviet courses of action, but would (1) examine the courses of action open to the Kremlin, and (2) estimate the general strategy it would be likely to adopt, in view not only of its own capabilities, but also of probable developments outside the Soviet bloc. Target date for submission of contributions: 1 December 1953.

b. Future Orientation of West Germany: This estimate would examine the various long-range economic, political and psychological factors -- internal and

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\* The indicated target dates for submission of contributions which are included in the succeeding paragraphs are tentative and are included here only as a general planning guide. Formal initiation of new estimates will be proposed to the IAC in accordance with existing practices, and specific deadlines will be arranged with the IAC representatives, as in the past, in connection with consideration of the terms of reference.

\*\* Whether this is really a new subject, or should be included in paragraph 3 below, depends upon whether the IAC completes action on Project Longview and issues it as an NIE.

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external -- which will affect West Germany's future course. Ratification of the various agreements between Germany and her Western neighbors would be assumed. Target date for submission of contributions: 15 January 1953.

- c. Prospects for the Development of Strength and Stability in Western Europe: This paper would examine trends in Western Europe as a whole and estimate their effect upon Western Europe's ability to develop and maintain political, economic and military strength. Target date for submission of contributions: 1 March 1953.

### III. PRIORITY RE-EXAMINATIONS OF EXISTING ESTIMATES

3. The following subjects, previously estimated, should be re-examined on a high priority (wherever possible as slants on existing estimates):

- a. Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action (through mid-1955): There is a continuing need for a standardized Soviet bloc estimate, published annually with an agreed format, which serves as the authoritative annual intelligence estimate each year for budget purposes, war plans, NATO

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planning, [redacted] conferences, etc. Unlike NIE-25 and NIE-64, however, new periodic examinations should be based upon a two year projection, i.e., through the fiscal year (1955) for which [redacted] <sup>lines</sup> + programs plans are made during the last half of 1953. [The Board plans to publish in the formal estimate only a relatively brief summary of capabilities based on separate studies of economic, political, military and scientific factors. The Board will request these separate studies from [redacted], EIC, SEC, and 25X1X7 Department of State. Since most of these studies already will have been coordinated by specialized intelligence committees, the Board will limit its coordinating action to those points where there are overlapping interests. These studies will then be published for the information of the recipients of the formal estimate. They will be clearly identified as supporting studies prepared by other intelligence organizations and will not bear the imprimatur of the IAC. The scope and format of these separate studies will be discussed at meetings to be convened at an early date, and time schedules will be considered. There will be no change of procedure with

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respect to those parts of the estimate which concern  
Soviet bloc courses of action.] Target date for com-  
pletion of the entire project will be September 1, 1953.

- b. East Germany: The present estimate expires at the end of 1952. [A new examination is required as a basis for understanding Soviet policy toward West Germany.] Target date for submission of contributions: 1 January 1953.
- c. Eastern European Satellites: The present estimate expires in mid-1953. [A new review of Satellite potential and of the developing nature of Soviet-Satellite relations is a continuing need. This paper should also include a detailed examination of the collectivization program in the Satellites.] Target date for submission of contributions: 1 April 1953.
- d. Korea: The present estimate expires in mid-1953. [Korea will continue to be an area of tension, whatever developments occur in the war or the armistice talks.] Target date for submission of contributions: 1 May 1953.
- e. Indochina: The present estimate expires in mid-1953,

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[and the situation will almost certainly require a new estimate.] Target date for submission of contributions: 1 April 1953.

- f. India: The present Indian estimate, completed in 1951, has become obsolete, and a new examination of India's economic and political problems is required. Target date for submission of contributions: 15 February 1953.
- g. Japan: This would be an estimate of Japan's immediate economic and political problems and their implications. It would supplement the broader appreciation of these problems included in NIE-52. Target date for submission of contributions: 1 March 1953.
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#### IV. ROUTINE NEW ESTIMATES

4. Preparation of estimates on the following subjects is considered desirable, [but of a lower priority than those subjects noted above. The Board will initiate them if and when it appears possible to complete them within the time span of this program, or earlier, if policy requirements or specific developments require it.]

- a. Indonesia, with special reference to basic factors and trends which will determine whether Indonesia will

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remain unstable and vulnerable to Communist exploitation.

- b. Greece, with special reference to its capacity for development without continuing US aid.
- c. Israel, with particular reference to internal political and economic strains and the various factors which will affect its position in the Middle East and in the East-West struggle, as well as US problems and responsibilities.
- d. The United Kingdom, with special reference to its future economic and political development and the various factors which will determine its future role in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and the East-West struggle generally.
- e. Likelihood of the Loss of Important Resources of  
(1) Africa, (2) Indian Subcontinent, (3) Middle East,  
and (4) Latin America. These would be initiated separately and follow the general approach of NIE-56.

V. O/NE ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

5. The periodic review of the world situation will be a continuing requirement. In April of this year the Board completed action on an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1953", and in November it completed action on an "Estimate of the World

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on an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1954." Hereafter this estimate will be done at least annually, and in 1953 the Board plans to complete an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1955" by mid-September.

VI. UNSCHEDULED PRODUCTION

6. The Board realizes that its program will not cover all possible situations on which estimates will be required during 1953. It is expected that developments and policy needs will, from time to time, necessitate the initiation of new estimates on a priority basis. For that reason, the program outlined above has been formulated so as to leave time free for other projects.

VII. GUIDES TO RESEARCH AND COLLECTION

7. The Board also realizes that the formal program of estimates does not encompass all the major intelligence problems of this government. Outlined below are several fields of study which the Board feels are of extreme importance, but on which it does not feel that National Intelligence Estimates should now be initiated. They are fields of study in which more collection and research efforts should be concentrated. In some instances research reports will provide a better basis for confident estimates of problems already included in the program; in other instances the research reports may carry such important implications that special estimates will be required. These fields of study are outlined below in a

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very general way; the Office of National Estimates is prepared to collaborate with other offices of this Agency and with other intelligence organizations in formulating more detailed and specific research requests.

a. The Present and Potential Strength of Communist

China: Estimates written during 1951 and 1952 have been hampered by a lack of solid and recent data on the political, economic and military situation in China. Pursuant to the post-mortem on SE-27, steps toward the improvement of economic intelligence on Communist China have already been taken. Similar steps need to be undertaken in the political and military fields.

b. Special Soviet Economic Problems: Adequate national intelligence effort has not yet been given to such problems as the location of Soviet industry, the degree of industrial concentration in geographic areas, the extent of regional self-sufficiency and interdependence, the Soviet transportation system, the stockpiling program, industrial bottlenecks, critical commodities in short supply, local and over-all vulnerabilities. Study of these subjects will assist in making estimates of over-all Soviet intentions and estimates of capabilities and intentions in particular areas (e.g., a

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study of the Soviet Far East as an aid in estimating Communist policy in Asia). They will assist in formulating national policies on a variety of subjects, including trade controls, war plans, weapons development, etc.

c. Soviet Air Offensive and Defensive Capabilities:

Despite continuing attention to these subjects, serious problems still exist. One such problem is that of acquiring the kind of data which permits adequate quantitative estimates, i.e., the kind of data which will permit an estimate, not alone of technical capacity, but of actual production and effective use by operational units. Another problem is that of converting these estimates into meaningful terms and setting forth their implications for US security.

d. Soviet Capabilities for Conducting Warfare by

Unconventional Means: Continuing studies in the fields of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, guided missiles, biological and chemical weapons, electronic measures, or other unconventional weapons (including sabotage and other clandestine warfare) are required. These studies, where appropriate, should cover production and effective operational use as well as levels of technical achievement.

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